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International production networks (IPNs) in East Asia are facing 
two challenges, i.e., COVID-19 and the US-China confrontation. 
COVID-19 has generated three kinds of shocks on IPNs: negative 
supply shocks, positive demand shocks, and negative demand 
shocks. IPNs have adequately managed these shocks thus far 
and have been strengthening the relative position of Factory Asia 
in the world. Nevertheless, the US-China confrontation and its 
consequences of weakening the rule-based trading regime have 
enhanced uncertainties in the operations of IPNs. The decoupling 
pressure may come from either the US or China for middle powers 
in-between, even with the US Biden Administration. This study 
posits that the construction of a mega-free trade agreement (FTA) 
network may partially reduce policy risks and help form a pro-trade 
middle-power coalition.
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I. Two Challenges on IPNs
East Asia, including both Northeast and Southeast Asia, has 
aggressively developed international production networks (IPNs) or the 
second unbundling in the past three decades and has achieved rapid 
economic growth and poverty alleviation (Ando and Kimura 2005, 
Baldwin 2016). This type of task-by-task international division of labor 
requires large differences in location advantages (e.g., wage gaps) to 
save in production costs and lower the costs of service links to connect 
remotely located production blocks. This circumstance explains why only 
few developing countries in the world can participate in IPNs. Other than 
most of the East Asian countries, only some Eastern European countries 
and a few Latin American countries such as Mexico and Costa Rica are 
significant IPN participants. Particularly in East Asia, the fragmentation 
of production and the formation of industrial agglomeration have 
transpired, and the entirety of East Asia has developed into “Factory 
Asia.” Until the next generation's international division of labor, i.e., cross-
border service outsourcing or the third unbundling, gains dominance, the 
second unbundling will continuously be a strength of East Asia.
However, East Asian IPNs are currently facing two challenges: 
COVID-19 and the US-China confrontation. COVID-19 started in China 
in late 2019 and quickly spread to the world in 2020. Global value chains 
(GVCs) (which include both IPNs and relatively slow trade in primary 
products, and materials) functioned as shock propagation channels. 
People initially overreacted to the initial shocks and blamed the disruption 
of GVCs. Some individuals claimed that the era of GVCs has ended and 
the concentration of production sites or “reshoring” (which means the 
return of production sites to the home country) had to be promoted. By 
contrast, others claimed that the wider spread of production sites would 
strengthen the robustness and resilience of GVCs.1 At the end, neither the 
end of GVCs nor the further spread of GVCs occurred. GVCs, particularly 
the portion of IPNs, exhibited their robustness and resilience, and 
Factory Asia has essentially preserved its production system thus far. I 
believe that the complicated nature of COVID-19 shocks, which comprise 
1 Miroudot (2020) refers to the risk management literature and distinguishes 
between robustness and resilience. The former means that a supply chain is less 
likely to be interrupted in facing a shock, and the latter indicates that a supply 
chain can resume quickly even if it is once interrupted by a shock.
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negative supply shocks, positive demand shocks, and negative demand 
shocks in different places and at different timings, caused the initial 
reaction of confusion.
The other challenge, which is also related to COVID-19 shocks, is the 
US-China confrontation. Although the confrontation is deeply rooted in 
the political and economic structure of both countries, explicit actions 
started as a “trade war” or “tariff war” in which the US imposed a series 
of tariffs on imports from China on the basis of Section 301 of the US 
1974 Trade Act and China retaliated. The disputes were not limited to 
“trade” but escalated to wider issues such as a series of controversies 
against Huawei. The concept of “national security” was expanded by a 
strong bipartisan support in the US Congress, and the “decoupling” from 
China began. The US-China confrontation has been even aggravated 
since COVID-19 spread globally, and China's reactions against the US 
and other countries have also intensified. Then, we again observed a sort 
of over-reaction. Some claimed that too much business concentration in 
China is like putting all eggs in one basket and such a situation must be 
resolved immediately. However, in reality, many businesses still approve 
of the operations in China and stay. Of course, there is a trend of labor-
intensive industries and some disadvantageous firms moving out of 
China, while some high-tech firms started moving out because of a clear 
threat of decoupling. What the private sector is eager to know is how far 
the decoupling would be expanded.
Although detailed statistical data remain unavailable at present, this 
study presents a tentative assessment on the two challenges faced by 
East Asian IPNs: COVID-19 and the US-China confrontation. The impact 
of digital transformation, a feature which is accelerated in developed 
and developing countries, is also briefly discussed in this research. 
Furthermore, this work claims that mega-FTAs (free trade agreements) 
may work at least partially to reduce uncertainties in the international 
trade order. The last section concludes the paper.
II. Multiple Shocks because of COVID-19
At the very early stage of the pandemic, Baldwin (2020) indicated that 
COVID-19 generates both supply shocks and demand shocks. Health 
policy in the form of social distancing and lockdowns certainly slows down 
production and consumption simultaneously. However, the strictness 
and length of restrictions differ between production and consumption, 
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and the timings of those restrictions also vary across countries and 
regions. To understand the situation in East Asia in particular, we must 
investigate the nature of shocks more carefully. Three kinds of shocks 
were generated by COVID-19 pandemic: negative supply shocks, positive 
demand shocks, and negative demand shocks.
From the viewpoint of East Asian economies other than China, the first 
type of shock, negative supply shocks, came in February 2020 in the form 
of a supply disruption of intermediate goods and final goods imported 
from China. However, the drop of imports from China immediately 
resumed in March 2020. Subsequently, COVID-19 spread globally, and 
lockdowns and other measures influenced production activities here and 
there at different timings. Actually, those shocks on a production system 
tend to be short-lived relative to consumption slumps.
The second shock type, positive demand shocks, came first for 
medical and essential goods such as face masks, hand sanitizers and 
pharmaceuticals and sometimes even food. Many goods as such are 
traded goods, and some exporting countries imposed temporary bans 
on exporting these goods so as to prioritize domestic consumption, a 
circumstance which generated a panic in importing countries and some 
mistrust in international trade.2 Fortunately, the situation returned to 
normal quickly despite the promotion of some reshoring for those goods. 
Another type of positive demand shock was caused by specific 
demand intensified by COVID-19. “Teleworking” enhances the demand 
for personal computers and related communication equipment, and 
“staying home” generates demand for various home-related, do-it-
yourself goods. The rebound of East Asian exports to North America 
and Europe was led by those positive demand shocks and partially 
helped the bottom-up growth of negatively growing economies.3
The last type entails negative demand shocks. The slowdown of the 
economies makes the conduct of various businesses difficult, generates 
layoffs, possibly worsens the performance of the financial sector, 
and causes risks on asset markets. The pandemic situation in North 
America and Europe particularly seems dire, and vaccines do not seem 
2 See Evenett (2020).
3 We are actually experiencing computer chip shortages due to positive 
demand shocks (Financial Times 2021). Moreover empty containers stay in North 
America due to the current asymmetric trade pattern between North America 
and East Asia (Nikkei Asia 2020).
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to improve the situation immediately. Even if East Asia continues to 
contain the disease relatively well, negative demand shocks from the 
rest of the world may continue for a while. With possible third and 
fourth waves of COVID-19, restrictions on people's movements, both 
domestic and cross-border, can only be removed gradually.
However, this circumstance presents a notable difference from the 
past economic crises, such as the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-
2008. We still observe a remarkably strong performance in the financial 
sector as well as no collapse in asset markets. These outcomes are 
probably caused by unprecedentedly strong mitigation and macro 
stimulus policies. Negative demand shocks may be prolonged, and we 
must carefully observe how far aggressive policies can be sustained. 
Nevertheless, we are managing the situation well thus far.4 Negative 
demand shocks seriously damage domestic services sectors such as 
various on-site services, transportation, tourism, and tradables (specifically 
apparel), a situation which drastically pushed down GDP while tradable 
sectors (particularly those with on-line shopping) are less affected. The 
bottom of international trade occurred at around May 2020 in most of the 
East Asian countries but the recovery may not be straightforward and 
show a K-shape trend.
Table 1 presents the seasonally unadjusted Japanese monthly export/
import data for machinery parts and final products (HS84: general 
machinery, HS85: electric machinery, HS86-89: transport equipment, 
and HS90-92: precision machinery) from January 2017 to October 2020. 
Trade was already sluggish in 2019, but an obvious drop because of 
COVID-19 occurred in 2020. As for imports of parts and final products, 
a salient trough was observed in February 2020, an outcome which is 
mainly caused by an interruption of imports from China, which was a 
negative supply shock. However, the trade quickly recovered in March 
2020. Another large trough is noted on the export side in May 2020 
because of negative supply shocks at home and negative demand shocks 
abroad. In particular, a drop of built-up car exports included in HS86-
89 was salient. HS 85 presented strong imports due to positive demand 
shocks.5
4 Concerns about fiscal health in the long run are presented in Zen and 
Kimura (2020).
5 In Table 1, HS851712 indicates cellular phones, which generate large 
fluctuations in the import of final machinery products.
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IPNs in East Asia, particularly in machinery industries, have proven to 
be robust and resilient again. A series of past studies including Obashi 
(2010), Ando and Kimura (2012), and Okubo, Kimura, and Teshima (2014) 
rigorously confirmed that machinery parts and components trade in East 
Asia was more robust and resilient than other types of trade, such as 
those in other goods and in other parts of the world, against substantial 
negative shocks including the Asian Currency Crisis, the Global Financial 
Crisis, and the East Japan Great Earthquake. This situation arises 
because IPNs include relation-specific, well-coordinated connections for 
which sunk costs are required in the long-run perspective. Once such 
an investment is made, firms would like to maintain the connection, 
even if temporary shocks occur. Negative supply shocks at this time 
were regarded as temporary, and this circumstance did not force firms to 
reshuffle their IPNs. Prolonged negative demand shocks, however, would 
trigger major changes in IPNs.6 Some extra effort may thus be required 
6 See Kimura (2020). A JETRO survey on foreign affiliates of Japanese firms 
published in September 2020 (https://www.jetro.go.jp/biz/areareports/special
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for hosting countries to keep IPNs.
Private companies are smart enough to manage the design and 
operations of IPNs by optimizing a balance between efficiency and 
risk management even before COVID-19. That situation explains the 
absence of massive reshuffling of IPNs thus far.
III. The US-China Confrontation
Trade policy by the US Trump Administration was problematic 
from the beginning. The US openly abandoned its position as a rule 
setter or a rule keeper in the international trade regime and started 
selfishly seeking advantageous bilateral deals by linking various policy 
modes such as national security. Renegotiations of FTAs, notably for 
the new Korea-US FTA (KORUS) and the new North American FTA 
(NAFTA, renamed as USMCA), included several protective and unusual 
measures in or out of the main text, such as the postponement of 
existing liberalization commitments, voluntary export restraints, the 
link of wage levels with the rules of origin, the link with exchange rate 
manipulation, and virtual prohibition of concluding FTAs with non-
market economies (the so-called poison clause). Section 232 of the US 
1962 Trade Expansion Act, which allows the US government to impose 
trade restrictions for national security reasons, was obviously abused, 
at least from the viewpoint of the trading partners, in the imposition 
of tariffs on steel and aluminum products imported from specific 
countries. Then Section 301 of the US 1973 Trade Act, which allows 
the US government to impose retaliatory measures against countries 
exercising unfair trade practices, was applied to China in four waves. 
These measures were inconsistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) 
commitments or at least violate norms in the rule-based trading regime. 
Some of the retaliatory or countering measures implemented by the 
trading partners also seemed to be WTO-inconsistent, thereby further 
weakening the rule-based trading regime.
The economic effects of a trade war are exactly the opposite of those 
from regional economic integration. When Countries A and Country B 
conclude an FTA, Country C experiences a positive trade creation effect 
/2020/0901/700949ccb7761567.html) also indicates that their major concern 
resided on the demand side.
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because of the activated world economy by the FTA and a negative trade 
diversion effect because of a reduction in exports to A and B. In most 
simulation results, the total economic effects on Country C are likely 
to be slightly negative. In the case of a trade war between Countries 
A and B, Country C encounters a negative trade creation effect and a 
positive trade diversion effect, with the latter possibly surpassing the 
former. In fact, several Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
member states conducted aggressive trade and investment promotion 
policies to capture that positive trade diversion effect, an endeavor in 
which Vietnam was particularly successful. However, the US-China 
confrontation is expanding its scope, and a negative trade creation 
effect seems to dominate gradually.
Unfortunately, the US-China confrontation did not limit itself to a 
trade war. A series of Huawei issues were early symptoms in which the 
concept of national security was expanded in definition and cases were 
linked with broader concerns related to the strategic conflict between 
the superpowers. The leakage of technologies and scientific knowledge 
generated a list of serious concerns on the US side. As for the broadly 
defined “sensitive” technologies possibly linked to security issues, 
several restrictions on China-related activities began to be implemented 
with a strong bipartisan congress support, including the strengthening 
of export control and of inward foreign investment regulations and 
the exclusion of China-related companies from the US government 
procurement and of China-related companies from supply chains (the 
so-called “clean network” initiative). The confrontation has intensified 
further during the COVID-19 pandemic with enhancing mutual 
mistrust. Decoupling will surely be developed although we do not know 
the scope yet.
The responses from the Chinese side have also become increased. 
China stopped hiding its dissatisfaction and started being aggressive 
against not only the US but also other countries. China sometimes 
applied trade policy and other economic policies to express political 
dissatisfaction against its neighbors such as Japan and South Korea 
but now does not restrain itself against others, including Australia. A 
crush at the border between India and China aggravated their bilateral 
relationship. The national security legislation was imposed in Hong 
Kong. The Export Control Act and other measures were enforced in 
response to similar legislation on the US side but with more room for 
policy discretion. Decoupling pressure to third countries may now 
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emerge only from the US but also from China.
The Biden Administration seems to keep a hardline approach on 
economic issues against China, at least for a while; thus the inertia 
of decoupling may be intensified. Middle powers between the US 
and China have established close economic relationships with both 
nations despite the varying country-by-country “distances” from the 
two superpowers. The US and China themselves also have a close 
economic relationship, and therefore many economists believe that their 
decoupling cannot resemble a real cold war between the US and the 
former Soviet Union. From the viewpoint of in-between middle powers, 
ascertaining the scope of the coming decoupling is crucial as regards 
industries, firm nationalities, and geographical extensions. Firms whose 
technology is likely to be sensitive have already started moving out of 
China. However, other firms tend to stay and carefully watch how the 
decoupling would proceed. The US-China confrontation is therefore 
generating serious uncertainties in the operation of IPNs.
IV. Penetration of Digital Technology
Another element related to IPNs is digital technology. Digital 
transformation is accelerated by COVID-19 in developed and developing 
countries, particularly at the forefront of communications technology 
(CT) such as the Internet and smartphones. Restrictions on people's 
movements have been a major challenge for IPN operations. However, 
we have not yet observed any notable reshuffling of IPNs despite the 
serious lack of physical movements of people. Instead, firms have 
intensified the usage of online communication as a substitute. Such an 
effort is likely to generate irreversible changes in CT usage which works 
as a complement to the physical movements of people and reduces 
the costs of service links that remotely connect located production 
blocks even after the resumption of the movement of people. Certainly, 
developing countries must soon face another challenge when the 
massive introduction of information technology (IT) such as robotics 
and artificial intelligence begins in developed countries. Together with 
the upgrading of CT, developing Asia must keep up with the trend of 
intensifying IT in manufacturing activities.7
7 A simplistic gravity equation exercise by Obashi and Kimura (2020) suggests 
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In addition, a new type of international division of labor or the third 
unbundling is expanding under COVID-19. Again, in developed and 
developing countries, COVID-19 pushes us to expand teleworking by 
CT. This situation substantial lowers the technical and psychological 
barriers to utilizing cross-border service outsourcing, a situation which, 
in turn, accelerates the development of the third unbundling; that is 
one task can be completed by remotely located individuals. Although 
capturing such a trend in official statistics is difficult presently, 
anecdotal evidence exists. For example, after COVID-19 came to Japan, 
online English conversation classes for children boomed. Outstanding 
English language teachers are located mostly in Cebu Island in the 
Philippines, where prices are much cheaper than for on-site English 
classes in cities with extensive product differentiation. Moreover, 
multiple ranking systems are on the Web. Digital connectivity is also a 
powerful feature for carrying out digitized services regardless of physical 
distance.
V. New Roles Played by Mega-FTAs
We are now facing multiple uncertainties in the trading regime. 
In particular, from the viewpoint of middle powers, the behavior of 
superpowers is entirely uncontrollable. However, at least one approach 
would partially mitigate the difficulty: the formation of a mega-FTA 
network.
A mega-FTA is defined here as an FTA of more than two countries 
and has two roles to play: further liberalization and international 
rulemaking. Since its establishment, the WTO has unfortunately been 
unable to lead trade and investment liberalization and new rulemaking 
so as to evolve the international trade order to reflect rapidly advancing 
globalization. Even if they involve a limited number of countries, 
mega-FTAs are meant to lead the world by showing a new standard of 
liberalization and novel rulemaking. Since Mr. Trump came into the 
White House, however, the weakening of rule-based trading regime 
has advanced particularly because of the discretionary manipulation 
of trade policy by superpowers. Therefore, the original two roles are 
that the introduction of industrial robots and the betterment of CT make newly 
developed East Asian economies enhance their involvement in IPNs.
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continuously important, but a couple of new roles are added, namely, 
to reduce policy risks and form a pro-trade middle-power coalition.
Furthermore, people have started emphasizing the notion that 
mega-FTAs are not static but are expected to be dynamic. Signing, 
ratifying, and validating are not the final goals of a mega-FTA. A 
mega-FTA can be a living, evolving agreement; thus how to utilize it 
effectively and to what extent it can be developed become important. 
From such a viewpoint, we briefly review two major mega-FTAs in East 
Asia: the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP) that was signed by 11 countries in March 2018 
and became effective in seven countries at present and the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) that was 
signed by 15 countries, excluding India, in November 2020.
The CPTPP was concluded after the US walked out of the original 
Trans-Pacific Trade Agreement (TPP) and thus substantially reduced 
trade creation effects. However, the CPTPP successfully set a new 
standard of the liberalization level and the proto-type format of 
international rulemaking for East Asia. Any trade agreement in this 
region will be evaluated in comparison with the CPTPP from now on. 
The CPTPP also substantially reduces policy risks at least among the 
member states and forms a pro-trade coalition of middle powers located 
between the US and China. CPTPP member countries may find it 
difficult to directly address superpowers. Nevertheless, the CPTPP can 
stabilize trade relationships among the member states and appeal for 
the importance of free trade and investment to the rest of the world.
The evolving nature of the CPTPP is particularly found in the possible 
expansion of its membership. The United Kingdom (UK), Thailand, 
and other nations are now seriously considering accession to the 
CPTPP.8 With these countries, the CPTPP would more clearly express its 
characteristics as a pro-trade middle-power coalition. With Japan as chair 
of the CPTPP Committee in 2021, some accession negotiations are likely 
to start soon. It is logical for South Korea to join the CPTPP to create a 
good balance between the US and China as a free-trade supporter. The 
US may not come back immediately, but in some form, the US would 
revive its presence in East Asia. A direct return to TPP would obviously 
8 The UK formally applied for CPTPP membership on February 1, 2021 (https://
asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Trade/UK-to-apply-for-TPP-membership-Monday-for-
bridge-to-Asia, accessed on January 31, 2021).
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be easiest and would require a small negotiation on 22 frozen items set 
up for the CPTPP. Nevertheless the US may want to expand the scope of 
the agreement, particularly as regards labor and environment, thereby 
reflecting the interest of the Democrats. In any case, other countries 
would be wise to join the CPTPP before the US.
China also expresses its interest in joining the CPTPP. If China was 
engaged in a substantial reform to make itself a “normal” country, then we 
should certainly welcome it. China would encounter three major hurdles 
to meet the qualification: liberalization, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
and e-commerce. As for liberalization, the CPTPP requires a 99%–100% 
tariff removal in terms of the tariff lines and services and investment 
liberalization in the negative-list approach (the method in which non-
liberalizing items are listed). These features are at liberalization levels that 
China has not yet experienced. The discipline of SOEs would basically 
entail that SOEs be requested to not jeopardize healthy competition 
with private companies in both domestic and international markets. 
The e-commerce chapter of the CPTPP would require countries to follow 
three major principles: free flow of data, no imposition of data localization 
requirements, and no imposition of forced disclosure of source codes. If 
we interpret these policy disciplines literally, China must conduct a series 
of substantial reforms. However, China may post that the situation is a 
matter of negotiation. Actually, tariff removal coverage is 95% for Japan 
because of its agricultural protection. Many exclusions and exceptions are 
involved in the discipline on SOEs, particularly in Malaysia and Vietnam. 
As for e-commerce, how strictly these policy disciplines would be enforced 
in the interface with each country's domestic laws and regulatory 
framework remains unclear. CPTPP member countries must stringently 
assess their own implementation of the policy discipline and clarify the 
aspects that would be requested from China to meet the qualification.
The assessment of the RCEP in journalism tends to occur at two 
extremes. One camp examines the country coverage and asserts that 
the RCEP would be the largest FTA in the world and be likely to be 
dominated by China. The other claims that the liberalization level of the 
RCEP would be too low and that such a low-quality agreement would 
entail minimal economic gains. I think both assertions are somewhat 
misleading. The RCEP was, in fact concluded under the strong initiative 
of the ASEAN and not of China. Moreover, the living, evolving nature 
of the agreement must be emphasized in terms of liberalization and 
rulemaking.
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The level of tariff removals is low in the RCEP relative to the CPTPP 
but is not extremely low at 91% on average. Japan will be connected 
to China and South Korea for the first time by an FTA. Tariff removals 
will be advanced compared with existing ASEAN+1 FTAs, particularly 
in cases of ASEAN latecomers, i.e., Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and 
Vietnam. The rules of origin will be more trade-friendly than existing 
FTAs. Service liberalization attempts to apply a negative-list approach 
which will require some additional negotiations. Thus, we will observe 
some positive trade creation by the RCEP. The rulemaking of the RCEP 
will cover a wide range of policy modes and will set the starting point of 
further rulemaking negotiations for China and ASEAN Member States. 
In particular, the e-commerce chapter states the free flow of data and 
no data localization requirements, with a wide range of exemptions. An 
RCEP review is planned five years after the agreement takes effect. Both 
the liberalization and the rulemaking must be deepened so as to catch 
up with the standard that the CPTPP establishes.
Is it possible for the RCEP to reduce policy risks and help form a 
middle-power coalition? Communications between China, Japan, 
and South Korea have always been thin even if these countries 
have deep economic relationships. Would it be beneficial to expand 
communication channels? China sometimes utilizes spotty trade policy 
to express its political dissatisfaction. Can other countries have any 
opportunity to discuss this situation in RCEP-related meetings? India 
walked out of the RCEP negotiation mainly due to its concerns about 
trade deficit against China. Can India consider the importance of IPNs 
and return to the RCEP? The signing of the RCEP was possible because 
of the centrality of the ASEAN. Is such a strong initiative by the ASEAN 
sustained? Utilizing the forum effectively in an evolving manner is vital 
particularly in the case of the RCEP.
VI. Conclusion
Covid-19 is certainly a serious challenge for IPNs in East Asia. 
However, IPNs are effectively managing negative supply shocks and 
positive demand shocks and are continuously fighting against negative 
demand shocks. With the acceleration of CT usage, Factory Asia seems 
to be rather strengthened relative to the other parts of the world, after 
COVID-19.
The US-China confrontation and the weakening of rule-based trading 
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regime have generated many uncertainties in the operations of IPNs and 
other types of economic activities. Middle powers located between the 
US and China would like to maintain good economic relationships with 
both if possible. The private sector attempts to perceive the scope of 
decoupling very carefully. Although the governments of middle powers 
cannot entirely control the discretionary moves of superpowers, some 
approaches can reduce uncertainties. One of the possible measures 
is the formation of mega-FTAs. In parallel, middle powers must be 
proactive in the WTO reform and not just be free riders as they have 
been in the past.
The US Biden Administration is a big hope for East Asia and the 
world, but we are unsure about its trade policy. The inclination toward 
domestic industrial revival may potentially connect to protectionism. 
The attitude toward the WTO and rule-based trading regime also 
remains unclear. A tough stance toward China seems to continue, 
although the extent of decoupling is unknown. Finally a pro-trade 
middle-power coalition in East Asia would play an important role for 
the US to return to an orderly trading environment.
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